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In 1874, Irish parliamentarian Isaac Butt said in the House 
of Commons that “it would be for the advantage of the 
administration of justice if the Irish judges were appointed to the 
same extent as they are in England, upon the recommendation of 
the Lord Chancellor and without reference to official or political 
claims”.1  
While Butt failed to acknowledge that judicial 
appointments in England and Wales were, to some extent, also 
subject to “political claim”, he was correct in his concern with 
such influence in Ireland, particularly in the proliferation of 
puisne judgeships conferred in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Concern about political claim is, however, only one of a number 
of issues in relation to judicial appointment that goes to the heart 
of the need for an impartial and independent judiciary. Yet, since 
the early days of the creation of an independent Ireland – when 
attention turned to the creation of a new judiciary – there has been 
little research on judicial appointments in Ireland.2 Exceptionally, 
Bartholomew’s research on the Irish judiciary in 1969 found that 
the Irish judge was white, male, upper middle-class, urban, a 
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barrister, with a background in politics, and a largely conservative 
approach.3 Equivalent research in 2004, though only of superior 
courts judges, found a not radically different picture.4 Significant 
differences in the 2004 study were that there were 13.5% of 
female judges, as against 0% in 1969. There was a drop of almost 
30% in those coming from a background with lawyers in the 
family, though still high at 40%. There was an increase of almost 
3% in those with a background as a solicitor, as against 0% in 
1969. And 62% of respondents in 2004 reported no political 
affiliation at the time of their appointment, as against 12% in 
1969. 
Within the last 15 years, concern about aspects of this 
homogeneity, and remaining political influence in the 
appointments system, received increased attention. In 1994, 
controversy over one high-profile judicial appointment gave rise 
to reform of part of the process of judicial appointments. In 1999, 
the All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution 
investigated and reported on judicial appointments through the 
creation of a Judicial Appointments Advisory Board. It concluded 
that there was no need for further reform.5 Nonetheless, concerns 
about the process of appointment continue to be raised within 
media,6 academic7 and non-governmental8 sectors. Similar 
concerns about the independence of the process, and also, about 
_____________________________________________________ 
3 Bartholomew, The Irish Judiciary (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 
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4 Carroll, “You be the Judge: Part I – A Study of the Backgrounds of Superior 
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Report: The Courts and the Judiciary, (Dublin: Stationery Office, 1999). 
6 Browne, “Time to scrutinize judicial appointments”, Sunday Business Post, 
25 July 2004.  
7 Bacik, Costello and Drew, Gender InJustice (Dublin : Trinity College Dublin 
Law School, 2003); Morgan, “Selection of Superior Judges”, (2004) 22 I.L.T. 
42; Byrne and McCutcheon, The Irish Legal System (4th ed.) (Dublin: 
Butterworths, 2001); Carroll, “You be the Judge: Part I – A Study of the 
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Accountability and the Irish Judiciary (Dublin: Irish Council for Civil 
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equality, fair representation and diversity in the judiciary – 
principally in relation to under-representation on the grounds of 
gender, ethnicity and disability – have led to reforms in other 
countries;9 which provides a basis for measured comparison of 
the current position on judicial appointments in Ireland. 
 
 
I. JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS: IRELAND 
The Government of Ireland Act, 1920 established a 
Supreme court for Ireland. It also created a High Court of Appeal 
for Ireland to hear appeals from both Southern Ireland and 
Northern Ireland, which was abolished upon the creation of the 
Irish Free State in 1922. However, there existed in Ireland 
between 1920 and June 1924 a parallel system of courts, the Dáil 
Courts, established by the parliament, Dáil Éireann.10 The present 
system of courts was created in 1924.11 The superior courts 
became the High Court and the Supreme Court, which after 1933 
became the highest appellate court following the abolition of 
appeals to the Privy Council at Westminster. The former county 
courts and quarter sessions courts were merged in a unified court 
called the “Circuit Court of Justice”. The lowest court is the 
District Court, from which appeals can be made to the Circuit 
Court. Appeals from the Circuit Court can be made on civil and 
family matters to the High Court, or on appeal from indictment to 
the Court of Criminal Appeal. A Special Criminal Court tries 
offences where it is determined that the ordinary courts are 
inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice and the 
preservation of public peace and order. In addition, the Criminal 
Division of the High Court (“The Central Criminal Court”) tries 
serious crime, including murder and rape.  
_____________________________________________________ 
9 Malleson and Russell (eds.), Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power 
(Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2006); Levy, “Judicial Selections Reform 
in Comparative Context”, (2007) 40 University of British Columbia Law 
Review 591. 
10 Kotsonouris, Retreat from Revolution: The Dáil Courts, 1920-24 (Dublin: 
Irish Academic Press, 1994). 
11 The Courts of Justice Act, 1924. 
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Prior to 1995, all appointments to the courts were made 
upon recommendation by the Government to the President – as 
provided for in the Constitution. 
 
A. Constitution 
The Constitution of Ireland sets out a tripartite separation of 
powers: legislative, executive and judicial, held by the courts to 
be fundamental.12 The Constitution makes clear that the powers 
of the legislature, executive and judiciary “derive, under God, 
from the people, whose right it is to designate the rulers of the 
State and, in final appeal, to decide all questions of national 
policy, according to the requirements of common good.”13 Article 
35.1º.i of the Irish Constitution provides that: “[t]he judges of the 
Supreme Court, the High Court and all other courts established in 
pursuance of Article 34º.i hereof shall be appointed by the 
President”. Article 13.9º.i provides that the President’s powers 
“shall be exercisable and performable only on the advice of the 
Government”. In effect, it is the Government which selects the 
judges. 
Controversy arose in 1994 over the Taoiseach’s 
appointment of the Attorney General to the vacant post of 
President of the High Court despite a political controversy over 
the delay by the Attorney General’s office in bringing 
proceedings against a priest accused of sexual offences.  
This controversy gave rise to legislative reform of part of the 
process for judicial appointment, by way of the creation of a 
Judicial Appointments Advisory Board.14 Despite well-
researched data on low-representation of women in judicial office 
in Ireland,15 no apparent programmatic action has been taken in 
response by the Government, legal profession or judiciary. 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
12 “The doctrine of the separation of powers under the Constitution has been 
identified by this Court as being both fundamental and far-reaching, and has 
been set out in various decisions of this Court in very considerable detail” 
(Attorney General v. Hamilton [1993] I.L.R.M. 81, at 96, per Finlay C.J.). 
13 Constitution of Ireland 1937, Article 6.1º.i. 
14 Courts and Court Officers Act, 1995. 
15 Bacik, Costello and Drew, Gender InJustice (above). 
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B. Judicial Appointments Advisory Board 
The Board commenced operation in 1996. Its functions are 
to identify persons and inform the Government of the suitability 
of those persons for appointment to specified judicial office.16 
The Board may adopt such procedures as it thinks fit to carry out 
its functions.17 It may also: (a) advertise for applications for 
judicial appointment, (b) require applicants to complete 
application forms, (c) consult persons concerning the suitability 
of applicants to the Board, (d) invite persons, identified by the 
Board, to submit their names for consideration by the Board,  
(e) arrange for the interviewing of applicants who wish to be 
considered by the Board for appointment to judicial office, and  
(f) do such other things as the Board considers necessary to 
enable it to discharge its functions under this Act.18  
As acknowledged by the Oireachtas Committee on the 
courts and the judiciary: “[t]his recent procedure supersedes the 
rather informal process pursued by successive governments who 
were seen to appoint, almost invariably, their own supporters to 
judicial office”.19 Oddly, the Committee stated: “[t]he short-
listing procedure in Ireland compares favourably with those in 
other common law countries because the opportunity has been 
taken to combine the best features of those systems”.20 As will be 
shown shortly, the procedure in Ireland is deficient when 
compared to reforms of the procedures for judicial appointments 
elsewhere. 
By 2008, there were 143 judges in Ireland; of whom 
22.38% were women. In 1993, women comprised 13% of the 
judiciary. In general, there has been a consistent year-on-year 
increase in female representation, as can be seen in Figure 1, 
below. There has been relatively less change year-on-year on the 
High Court. In fact, in 1993, women comprised 18% on that 
court. By 2008, that proportion had dropped to 13.5%. In the 
_____________________________________________________ 
16 Courts and Court Officers Act, 1995, s. 13(1). The Board’s first annual 
report was produced in 2002, pursuant to the Courts and Courts Officers Act, 
2002, s. 11.  
17 Courts and Court Officers Act, 1995, s. 14(1). 
18 Courts and Court Officers Act, 1995, s. 14(2). 
19 Fourth Progress Report: The Courts and the Judiciary, at 7. 
20 Fourth Progress Report: The Courts and the Judiciary, at 7. 
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absence of comprehensive longitudinal data on the pool of 
eligible candidates, it is not possible to determine decisively 
whether these trends reflect under-representation of women in 
terms of the eligible pool. Nonetheless, it is clear that the 
proportion of women in judicial office in Ireland is low compared 
to their status in other occupational sectors, and much lower than 




Figure 1. Female representation in judicial office in Ireland, 
1996 – 2008 
 
While there remains low representation of women in the 
judiciary, such low representation is not unique in the workforce. 
Despite substantial increase in labour force participation by 
women generally, female participation rates remain below the 
average for OECD countries for all except the under-thirties.21 
The low-representation of women in the judiciary and the 
marked lack of government (or judicial) debate about such low-
representation is in marked contrast to the position taken by the 
government on gender equality elsewhere.22 Research is needed 
on the progression of women (and other minority groups) from 
_____________________________________________________ 
21 OECD Economic Surveys, Ireland (Paris: OECD, 2006). 
22 e.g., Department of Equality, Justice and Law Reform, National Women’s 
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the point of entry to law degrees through to judicial appointments, 
including examination of the reasons for exit at key stages such as 
in law school, before or during professional training, and in 
practice. There is no evidence within any of the annual reports of 
the Judicial Appointments Advisory Board (beyond monitoring 
applications on the basis of gender, experience in years and 
professional background) that it is concerned explicitly with 
issues of diversity or fair representation, in contrast to the 
approach of most judicial appointments bodies elsewhere. There 
are a number of other problems with the Board. Primarily, these 
reflect the statutory functions and powers of the Board rather than 
the operation. On occasion, the Board does not appear to go as far 
as it might in addressing a range of matters, which might be due 
to limited funding.  
 
C. Problems with the Board 
 
1. Composition of the Board 
The Board consists of seven members who are judges and 
practising lawyers, plus not more than three lay members.23  
The “legal” members comprise: the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court (who is the chairperson of the Board); the President of the 
High Court; the President of the Circuit Court; the President of 
the District Court; the Attorney General; a practising barrister 
nominated by the Chair of the Council of the Bar of Ireland; and a 
practising solicitor nominated by the President of the Law Society 
of Ireland. The “lay” members are appointed by the Minister for 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform, and must be engaged in, or 
have appropriate knowledge or appropriate experience of 
commerce, finance, administration, or have appropriate 
experience as consumers of the services provided by the courts. 
Thus, there is a preponderance of judges and legal 
professionals over lay representation. This may make difficult the 
exercise of lay views as against judicial and legal professional 
views.  
The Board has regularly comprised ten members. Of the 
current ten members only two are women, representing 20% of 
_____________________________________________________ 
23 Courts and Court Officers Act, 1995, s. 13(2). 
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the total. All Board members are white. This racial and gender 
representation is low. It is inconsistent with government 
commitments to, at least, larger gender representation on Boards 
generally.24 On the Judicial Appointments Commission in 
England and Wales, women comprise seven out of 15 members, 
equalling 46.67% of the total, with members from a minority 
ethnic background constituting two out of 15 members 
(representing 13.3% of the total). Of course, it might be argued 
that the low representation of women and minority ethnic 
members on the Judicial Appointments Advisory Board is due to 
the fact that seven of the positions are fixed to established posts, 
such as that of the Chief Justice or the Presidents of the High 
Court, Circuit Court and District Court, and that the occupation of 
such posts by men reflects the legacy of a time when few women 
entered the legal profession and the judiciary. This may be so, but 
such low representation might then be better addressed by reform 
of the Board to address such low representation through extension 
of the number of lay posts. The narrow representation of gender 
and ethnicity on the Board is problematic in so far as Board 
homogeneity may militate against recognition of the importance 
of diversity in the process of appointments. This is compounded 
by the predominance of legal and judicial representation.  
Given the risk that lay members may defer to senior legal and 
judicial members, some commissions have either equal 
representation of lay and legal/judicial members (as in Scotland) 
or a majority of lay members (as in Ontario). A further option, as 
in England and Wales, is to appoint a lay chair.25 
 
2. Composition of the Board 
The Board is limited in exercise of its functions to a 
specific range of judicial offices. These are ordinary judges of the 
Supreme Court; High Court; Circuit Court; and District Court. 
Thus, the following judicial appointments are not made by the 
_____________________________________________________ 
24 Statement by former Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Willie 
O’Dea, upon taking office in 2002, to the effect that he would legislate for a 
40% gender balance if there was no improvement in womens’ presence on 
state boards. 
25 See Malleson, “The New Judicial Appointments Commission in England and 
Wales” in Malleson and Russell (eds.), Appointing Judges, p. 39. 
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Board: Chief Justice; President of the High Court, Circuit Court 
or District Court, and any promotion from a lower court. As Ward 
notes in a report on behalf of the Irish Council for Civil Liberties: 
“[o]verall, this means that there are a significant number of 
persons elevated where an independent body has no role in 
advising the Government”.26 This becomes especially 
problematic where there is an increase in promotions between the 
Circuit Court and High Court, particularly given the risk of 
canvassing or lobbying for promotion and the attendant potential 
to politicise the 27judiciary.  
_____________________________________________________ 
 
3. Criteria for appointment 
The eligibility for appointment to judicial office is limited 
to barristers and solicitors who have standing for a specified 
period. The limitation on practising barristers and solicitors 
excludes academics who no longer practice or who have not 
practised continuously for the requisite period, but who are 
otherwise suitable for appointment to judicial office. If such an 
approach had been used in England and Wales, it would have 
excluded Baroness Hale in the House of Lords, or Jack Beatson, 
former Rouse Ball Professor of English Law at the University of 
Cambridge, believed to be the first academic lawyer appointed 
directly from an English Law Faculty on to the High Court 
Bench.  
Section 16 of the Act provides that the Board must not 
recommend a person unless, in the Board’s opinion, the person, 
inter alia: “(b) is suitable on the grounds of character and 
temperament” and “(c) is otherwise suitable”.28 There are a 
number of problems with this language. The words “character”, 
“temperament” and “otherwise suitable” are vague. As Kamlesh 
Bahl, Chairwoman of the former Equal Opportunities 
Commission in England and Wales pointed out: “[g]iven the 
26 Irish Council for Civil Liberties, op.cit., p. 52. 
27 Carroll, “You be the Judge – Part I”. See also Collins, “There is still no 
separation of party politics and the judiciary”, Sunday Tribune, 15 August 
2004, 13. 
28 A candidate must also have displayed in his/her practice a degree of 
competence and a degree of probity appropriate to and consistent with the 
appointment concerned, and comply with the requirements of s. 19 of the Act. 
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predominance of men in the senior ranks of the judiciary, the bar 
and the solicitor’s profession, there is an increased risk of 
stereotypical assumptions being made with regard to “female” as 
opposed to ‘male’ qualities and aptitudes”.29 Bahl referred to the 
risk with criteria such as “decisiveness” and “authority” that 
“[w]henever there is subjective judgment, sex bias can easily 
occur”.30  
The historical lack of transparency in appointments to 
judicial office in England and Wales, associated with the system 
of “secret soundings”, contributed to what was termed a 
“cloning” tendency in judicial selection.31 This risk is particularly 
strong in roles, such as judging, where the concept of the judge is 
associated with men and masculine attributes.32 The risk 
associated with vague criteria that might admit gender bias is one 
of the reasons for judicial appointments bodies elsewhere 
specifying criteria that are more explicitly tied to the functions of 
the judge. In Scotland, the Judicial Appointments Board sets out 
17 precise criteria for judicial appointment which aim to preclude 
bias. These include: “ability to marshal facts and competing 
arguments and reason logically to a correct and balanced 
conclusion” and “ability to communicate with all types of court 
user, including lay people, giving instructions, explaining 
complex issues and giving decisions clearly, concisely and 
promptly, either orally or in writing”.33 
_____________________________________________________ 
29 “Judicial Appointments Procedures”, Evidence to the Home Affairs 
Committee in Minutes of Evidence and Appendices, Third Report of Session 
1995-96, HC 52-II, vol II, at 211. 
30 “Judicial Appointments Procedures”, at 211. See, also, concerns in Ireland – 
Bacik, Costello and Drew, Gender InJustice (above). 
31 Kennedy, Eve was Framed: Women and British Justice (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1992). See also Her Majesty’s Commissioners for Judicial 
Appointments: Response to DCA Consultation Paper “Increasing Diversity in 
the Judiciary” (London: Commission for Judicial Appointments, 2005), and 
interview with Janet Tweedale, Department for Constitutional Affairs, London, 
1st February 2005, regarding the informal system in England and Wales in 
which it was stated that there was some anecdotal evidence that judges did not 
appoint those “not like us”.  
32 Rackley, “Representation of the (Woman) Judge: Hercules, the Little 
Mermaid, and the Vain and Naked Emperor”, (2002) 22 Legal Studies 602. 
33 The Judicial Appointments Board for Scotland, Annual Report 2002 – 2003 
(Edinburgh: Scotish Executive, 2003) pp. 8-9. 
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The process adopted in Ireland appears not to follow best 
practice in jurisdictions elsewhere which also face challenges in 
social and cultural diversity. In those jurisdictions applicants for 
judicial office must also show an understanding of the social 
issues of the day and an appreciation for the cultural diversity of 
their society.34 
 
4. Procedure for application 
Under section 16(2) of the 1995 Act, the Board’s 
recommendation functions are initiated upon request by the 
Minister where there is a vacancy or forthcoming vacancy in 
judicial office. In addition, the Board publishes annually 
advertisements inviting persons who wish to be considered for 
appointment to any judicial vacancies that may arise to submit 
their names to the Board. The Board also publishes 
advertisements from time to time inviting applicants in respect of 
specific vacancies which have or are about to arise. A person who 
wishes to be considered for appointment to judicial office is 
required to so inform the Board in writing, and to provide the 
Board with such information as it may require to enable it to 
consider the suitability of that person for judicial office, including 
information relating to education, professional qualifications, 
experience and character.35 The Board requires such persons to 
provide an application form which requires details of their 
practice, professional qualifications, education, character, etc.  
The Board has appointed a sub-committee to consider and advise 
on the large number of applications to the Circuit and District 
Courts. 
There are also a number of problems with the procedure for 
application.36 Applicants must state “why they consider 
themselves suitable”,37 which privileges those “in the know” and 
may disadvantage women, who tend to have lower confidence 
_____________________________________________________ 
34 e.g. Ontario, Canada. 
35 Courts and Courts Officers Act, 1995, s. 16(1). 
36 The Board received a report in October 2005 on aspects of the selection 
process from a consultancy firm with whom it had contracted. No mention is 
made in subsequent reports of any action being taken in respect of the report. 
37 Judicial Appointments Advisory Board, Annual Report 2002 (Dublin: 
Judicial Appointments Advisory Board, 2002), at 6. 
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levels than men in applying for judicial posts, tend to be excluded 
from the informal flows of information in the profession,38 and 
tend not to use the same fulsome self-promoting language as 
men.39 The time allowed for applications is very short, on 
occasion two weeks.40 
The Board has not to date arranged to exercise its power to 
interview any candidate. This contrasts with the approach adopted 
by many judicial appointments bodies elsewhere, who have also 
introduced a further range of mechanisms, such as simulated 
competency exercises, to test the suitability of applicants. 
Unsuccessful applicants receive no feedback on why they have 
been unsuccessful, again in the contrast to the approach 
increasingly favoured by judicial appointments bodies elsewhere. 
The Board is limited to nominating seven candidates, if 
numbers are sufficient. It is not required to rank the candidates, 
and has rejected the possibility that it would do so on the basis 
that it “is conscious … of the difficulties which might result from 
such a change, not least the question as to whether it would place 
unjustifiable constraints on the exercise by the Government of a 
function which is exclusively assigned to it under the 
Constitution”,41 which reasoning has rightly been criticised as 
unpersuasive.42 Moreover, the Government is not obliged to 
select from the list.43 The Courts and Courts Officers Act, 1995,  
s. 16(6) provides only that the Government shall firstly consider 
the names on the list. Section 16(8) of the Act requires the 
Government to publish notice of an appointment in Iris Oifigiúil,  
and, if applicable, a statement that the named appointee was 
recommended by the Board. The Oireachtas Committee on the 
courts and the judiciary concluded that the effect of this section 
was that “the government is encouraged to choose only persons 
_____________________________________________________ 
38 Bacik, Costello and Drew, Gender InJustice (above). 
39 Feenan, Applications by Women for Silk and Judicial Office in Northern 
Ireland (Belfast: Commissioner for Judicial Appointments for Northern 
Ireland, 2005). 
40 Judicial Appointments Advisory Board, Annual Report 2006 (Dublin: 
Judicial Appointments Advisory Board, 2006), at 14. 
41 Judicial Appointments Advisory Board, Annual Report 2002, at 23. 
42 Morgan, “Selection of Superior Judges” (above). 
43 The Government did not seek the advice of the JAAB when appointing the 
Hon. Mr Justice Sean Ryan to the High Court in 2003. 
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recommended by the Board”.44 It has been suggested that the list 
should be reduced.45 
 
D. Beyond the Judicial Appointments Advisory Board 
Beyond the Judicial Appointments Advisory Board, there is 
a lack of transparency in the Government’s selection of 
candidates; both in relation to the Board’s recommendations and 
in relation to those posts over which the Board has no role.  
The Government does not publish criteria on the process of 
selection, nor does it publish reports on its deliberations.46 What 
is known of the process is limited. Prior to the introduction of the 
Board, David Gwynn Morgan stated of the process of 
appointment:  
 
The selection will often be the outcome of deliberation at a 
government meeting (as the first item on the agenda). 
Sometimes this will involve debate if different Ministers 
champion different candidates (as happens more often for 
appointments to the lower courts in the hierarchy). 
Consultation with judges or senior practitioners, as to the 
merits of the candidates, by way of the Attorney General, 
sometimes occurs. In any case, the Attorney General will be 
present at the meeting and the views of a strong Attorney 
General will be listened to.47 
 
Where there is a coalition government, it seems that the 
Taoiseach consults with the other party leader(s),48 though it has 
been noted that “[i]f the Taoiseach … has a favourite, that man 
will make the appointment”.49 Notwithstanding the introduction 
of the Judicial Appointments Advisory Board, much concern 
remains that those appointed to judicial office have had 
connections with the political party or parties whose members 
_____________________________________________________ 
44 Oireachtas Committee, p. 7. 
45 Morgan, “Selection of Superior Judges” (above); Carroll, “You be the Judge 
– Part II” (above), and Irish Council for Civil Liberties (op.cit.). 
46 Irish Council for Civil Liberties 
47 Morgan, The Separation of Powers in the Constitution, p. 202. 
48 Coakley and Gallagher (eds.), Politics in the Republic of Ireland, 4th ed. 
(London: Routledge, 2005). 
49 Bartholemew, The Irish Judiciary, p. 122. 
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form the Government, which is responsible, in part, for 
appointments.50 It is also clear that the Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform receives representations from members 
of the Oireachtas in respect of judicial appointments, and that a 
number of persons on behalf of whom such representations are 
made are subsequently appointed to judicial office.51 
There is no independent audit of the Government process 
(or, indeed, that of the Judicial Appointments Advisory Board), in 
contrast to the recent approach elsewhere – such as in Northern 
Ireland with the former Commissioner for Judicial Appointments 
for Northern Ireland and his replacement, the Northern Ireland 
Judicial Appointments Ombudsman.52 The Ombudsman is 
empowered to investigate complaints from applicants for judicial 
appointments where maladministration or unfairness is alleged to 
have occurred in the process by the Northern Ireland Judicial 
Appointments Commission, the Northern Ireland Courts Service, 
or the Lord Chancellor. In the Republic of Ireland, the only legal 
sanction against the Government or Judicial Appointments 
Advisory Board would appear to be judicial review. 
The reforms elsewhere in terms of transparency and 
accountability have been introduced primarily in response to 
under-representation on the grounds of gender and ethnicity. But 
the need for transparency and accountability also has relevance 
where politics may affect the process of judicial appointment. 
Two key dangers arise where the executive is involved in the 
process of appointment. First, there is the risk to the separation of 
powers between the judiciary and executive which lies at the 
heart of any democracy. Secondly, there is a risk that judicial 
independence may be undermined if either the executive is able to 
appoint judges whom it believes will pursue a political approach 
and/or where judges believe that such political appointment 
permits them to do so. In relation to the first risk, it is not 
disputed that in a constitutional democracy there needs to be 
some process by which the judiciary are ultimately held 
accountable to the people. Indeed, this is reflected in the Irish 
_____________________________________________________ 
50 Byrne and McCutcheon, The Irish Legal System. 
51 523 Dáil Debates 1186-1187. 
52 Established by the Constitutional Reform Act, 1995, and commenced on 
25th September 2006. 
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Constitution. Nor is it argued that the executive may have some 
role in the process of appointment. But the system of checks and 
balances that constitutes a democracy characterised by separation 
of powers is less about impermeable boundaries than with the 
nature of the checks and balances. 
The problem in Ireland appears to lie in an uncritical 
assessment by the executive of the relationship between the 
legitimate, and indeed constitutionally required, role of “the 
people” in appointments and a process that is more fully 
transparent, accountable and fair.  
This is reflected in the too-easy dismissal by the Oireachtas 
Committee of the option for reform of the process of judicial 
appointments, when it states: “[t]he independence of the judiciary 
might suggest that the executive should have no discretion in the 
appointment of judges. But, since the judiciary is an organ of 
state, it must ultimately be held accountable to the people”.53  
The Committee goes on to quote the former Chief Justice, Finlay 
C.J., who stated in an interview:  
 
At the end of the day somebody must be accountable for the 
standard and type of judiciary that is appointed. There is a 
significant amount to be said for making politicians 
accountable for the standard and type of judiciary that is 
appointed. They are the ones to whom the people in general 
can turn if bad judicial appointments are being made.  
If appointments are being made by some body of people who 
are relatively anonymous then there is no-one to turn to and 
blame.54 
 
The Oireachtas Committee concluded: 
 
The committee takes the view that our present system of 
appointing judges should be retained. It feels that the 
government has sufficient non-partisan advice from the 
Judicial Appointments Advisory Board and that it, as the 
executive of the elected representatives of the people should 
retain the final decision. It is significant that because the 
_____________________________________________________ 
53 Oireachtas Committee, at 7-8. 
54 Oireachtas Committee, at 8, citing Finlay C.J. interview in Sturgess and 
Chubb, Judging the World (London: Butterworths, 1988), pp. 413-414. 
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judicial candidates are already short-listed by the board 
strictly on merit, the government cannot be open to the 
criticism that it appoints only its own supporters rather than 
suitably qualified persons when it chooses from the list.55  
 
There are a number of problems with these approaches. 
First, the use of the word “only” by the Oireachtas Committee 
admits reform only if the entire selection procedure were to be 
compromised by appointment of its supporters, rather than some 
of its supporters. Where the Government receives seven names 
from the Board, even where those names are selected on the basis 
of “merit”, the Government can still select from these names one 
of its own supporters. The Oireachtas Committee does not attend 
to this part of the process of selection. Secondly, the Committee 
does not address deficiencies in the Board process and in the non-
Board process. Instead, it appears to counter-pose the status quo 
with what it sees as the only alternative – election of judges – by 
stating that “[i]n the United States where the election of some 
state judges is made by the people, the judges are made directly 
accountable to the people on completion of the term for which 
they are elected”.56 This positing of one alternative only is then 
dismissed by the Committee, as follows: 
 
The committee agrees with the view of the Constitution 
Review Group that an election would expressly politicise the 
appointments procedure. There is of course the further 
danger that it would interfere with the impartiality of judges. 
Given that their tenure is dependent on successive election 
by the electorate, judges could be persuaded to adopt popular 
stances on matters coming before the courts so as to 
guarantee re-election.57 
 
Aside from this false dichotomy, the Committee does not 
seek to disentangle what may be some legitimate degree of 
participation by elected representations, such as one member from 
each party, subject to safeguards, in judicial appointments from 
_____________________________________________________ 
55 Oireachtas Committee, at 8. 
56 Oireachtas Committee, at 8. 
57 Oireachtas Committee, at 8. 
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the current process beyond the Board. The Committee goes on to 
conclude: 
 
The selection and appointments procedures in Ireland are 
broadly comparable to those that obtain in other common 
law states. In those states the law provides for consultation, 
either formal or informal, with members of the judiciary and 
the legal profession. Moreover, in all those states it is the 
executive that appoints the judiciary although there is a 
deviance from this in the United States at federal level …58  
 
In its report, which also examined other aspects of the 
judiciary, namely security of tenure and other conditions, judicial 
conduct, removal of judges, public transparency and judicial 
ethics, the aspect of judicial appointments was the only one in 
respect of which no recommendations for reform were made. It is 
noteworthy that the briefing paper upon which the Committee 
appear to have based their knowledge of judicial appointments in 
other countries, made no reference to the key critical studies of 
the appointments procedures in most of the common law 
countries examined: the United Kingdom,59 the USA,60 Canada,61 
and Australia.62  
The role of the executive in judicial appointments in 
Ireland would appear to violate the recommendations of the 
Council of Europe on the selection of judges, which state: 
 
… where the constitutional or legal provisions and traditions 
allow judges to be appointed by the government, there 
should be guarantees to ensure that the procedures to appoint 
_____________________________________________________ 
58 Oireachtas Committee, at 8. 
59 e.g. Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary, 5th ed. (London: Fontana, 1997); 
McGlynn, The Woman Lawyer: Making the Difference (London: Butterworths, 
1998); Stevens, The Judiciary in England and Wales (London: Justice, 1992). 
60 e.g. Martin, “Men and Women on the Bench: Vive la Difference?” (1990) 73 
Judicature 204. 
61 e.g. L’Heureux-Dubé, “Making a Difference: The Pursuit of a 
Compassionate Justice” (1997) 31 University of British Columbia Law Review 
1. 
62 e.g. Berns and Baron, “Bloody Bones: A Legal Ghost Story and 
Entertainment in Two Voices – To Speak as A Judge” (1994) 2 Australian 
Feminist Law Journal 125. 
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judges are transparent and independent in practice and that 
the decisions will not be influenced by any reasons other 
than those related to the objective criteria mentioned above 
[i.e. merit, qualifications, integrity, ability and efficiency].63 
 
The Council of Europe recommends that one such “guarantee” 
would be for “a special or independent and competent body to 
give the government advice which it follows in practice”.64  
The current procedure for appointment of judges in Ireland is 
neither transparent nor independent of the executive. Moreover, 
the processes cannot be said to “guarantee” against the influence 
of reasons other than those criteria legitimated in the Council of 
Europe recommendation. The proviso within the 
Recommendation, suggesting how such “independence” might be 
guaranteed, is hardly satisfied in Ireland where it is unclear that 
the advice of the Judicial Appointments Board is meaningfully 
followed “in practice”, and given that a number of judicial 
appointments are not subject to any such advice from an 
“independent and competent body”. 
The second risk identified with the process of executive 
involvement in the process of judicial appointment – of 
facilitating potential political bias in the judiciary – is now worth 
further examination. 
While there is no systematic research data on the effect of 
political appointment on judicial decisions in Ireland, evidence in 
the U.S.A. indicates that, at least on judicial appellate panels, the 
effect of political appointment correlates with judicial votes.65 
There is also some risk, given evidence that judges are more 
likely to be appointed on the basis of political allegiance where 
politicians are involved in the appointments process,66 that such 
political condoning in the appointment will be seen by the 
_____________________________________________________ 
63 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R (94) 12 
of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Independence, 
Efficiency and Role of Judges (1994), p. 2. 
64 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, p. 2. 
65 e.g. Sunstein, Schkade and Ellmann, Are Judges Political? An Empirical 
Analysis of the Federal Judiciary (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2006). 
66 Madhuku, “Constitutional Protection of the Independence of the Judiciary: A 
Survey of the Position in South Africa” (2002) 46 Journal of African Law 232. 
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appointee to justify particular political interpretations of the law. 
But even if it is difficult to prove conclusively, and to the extent 
necessary, that involvement of the executive in the process of 
appointments leads to correlative political bias, it cannot be 
denied that judging involves adjudicating on broad areas of policy 
where political values may come into play. This is particularly so 
in Ireland where judges of the High Court and Supreme Court 
exercise express power of judicial review under the Constitution 
of Ireland, but is similarly the case elsewhere with expanding 
powers of judicial review.67 
There is some acknowledgement in Ireland that judges may 
express views in judgment that lie outside a strict application of 
the law. This was acknowledged obliquely by a former Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of Ireland, Tom Finlay, when he 
indicated that some of his former colleagues approved criticism of 
the executive or legislature that was not a “manifestly essential 
ingredient in a judgment or ruling”.68 Moreover, that “judicial 
lawmaking” occurs, blurring the nominally strict separation of 
powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary, has also 
been acknowledged another former chief justice.69 This tendency 
is not limited to Ireland, nor is it one that arises only where the 
judiciary is appointed largely by the executive.  
Therefore, even if “political” bias cannot be proven 
conclusively, the risk that judges may exercise other bias or 
prejudice is real. Indeed, the influence of such bias in the law is 
apparently acknowledged by a former Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court in quoting with approval the America jurist Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, who stated: “even the prejudices which the 
judges share with their fellow men, have a good deal more to do 
than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should 
be governed”.70  
_____________________________________________________ 
67 Malleson, The New Judiciary: The Effects of Expansion and Activism 
(London: Ashgate Press, 1999). 
68 Finlay, “The Role of the Judge” (2005) 5 J.S.I.J. 1, 4. 
69 Keane, “Judges as Lawmakers: The Irish Experience” (2004) 4 J.S.I.J. 1. 
70 Keane, “Judges as Lawmakers”; quoting Holmes, The Common Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 1. 
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These risks underscore arguments for greater transparency 
and accountability in the process of judicial appointments, 
particularly where the executive is involved in the process. 
 
 
II. COMPARATIVE ASPECTS 
This section examines briefly judicial appointments in a 
small range of common law jurisdictions in order to identify 
possible reforms of the structures, processes and criteria for 
appointment in Ireland.71 The jurisdictions examined are:  
(A) England and Wales, (B) Scotland, (C) Northern Ireland,  
(D) Canada, (E) South Africa. In contrast to common law 
countries, in the civil law countries of continental Europe the 
judiciary is a career option based on academic qualifications. 
While gender representation is consistently higher in those 
countries than in common law countries, though there remains 
lower representation in the higher levels of the judiciary.72 
 
A. England and Wales 
In England and Wales, concern about the homogeneity of 
the judiciary has been more extensively documented over a longer 
period of time than in the other jurisdictions of the United 
Kingdom.73 Appointment to the higher courts by the Lord 
Chancellor raised concerns about the operation of an “old boy’s 
network”, “tap on the shoulder” appointments, and a lack of 
transparency.74 This was seen to disadvantage especially women 
and minority ethnic groups.75 In response, the government created 
in March 2001 a Commission for Judicial Appointments for 
_____________________________________________________ 
71 For other comparative surveys, see, e.g. Levy, “Judicial Selections Reform 
in Comparative Context” (2007) 40 University of British Columbia Law 
Review 591; Epstein, Knight and Shvetsova, “Comparing Judicial Selection 
Systems” (2001) 10 William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 7. 
72 Schultz and Shaw, Women in the World’s Legal Profession (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2003).  
73 See, e.g. Griffiths, The Politics of the Judiciary. 
74 For a review, see Malleson, “Promoting Diversity in the Judiciary – 
Reforming the Judicial Appointments Process” in Malleson and Russell (eds.), 
Appointing Judges, 221. 
75 Malleson and Banda, Factors Affecting the Decision to Apply for Silk and 
Judicial Office, Lord Chancellor’s Department Research Series No 2/00. 
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England and Wales to review the appointments process.  
A commitment to diversity in judicial appointments appeared in 
consultations and policies by the new Department for 
Constitutional Affairs.76 Subsequently, broader concerns about 
constitutional arrangements led to the Constitutional Reform Act 
2005, providing an opportunity for, inter alia, the creation of a 
Judicial Appointments Commission and, also, a Supreme Court 
Selection Commission for appointments to the forthcoming 
Supreme Court.77 The Judicial Appointments Commission is 
responsible for recommending candidates for a wide range of 
judicial offices listed in the Act. The Commission’s duties are to: 
select candidates on merit,78 select people only of good 
character,79 and have regard to the need to encourage diversity in 
the range of people available for selection for appointment.80 
Both commissions put forward only one name to the Minister for 
Justice, who will, invariably, approve the recommendation or 
provide a reasoned request that a new process of appointment be 
engaged. To protect further against any abuse of the process, 
Parliament legislated for a Judicial Appointments and Conduct 
Ombudsman responsible for, inter alia, auditing, and complaints 
about, the appointments process.81 The Judicial Appointments 
Commission accomplished, inter alia, within its first year the 
following: a definition of “merit”, review of the process of 
appointment, and development and implementation of a range of 
outreach activities.82 The process of appointment will now 
include qualifying tests as an alternative assessment method to the 
_____________________________________________________ 
76 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Increasing Diversity in the Judiciary, 
Consultation Paper CP 25/04; Department for Constitutional Affairs (co-signed 
by the Lord Chief Justice and Chair of the Judicial Appointments 
Commission), Judicial Diversity Strategy (2006). The Department was 
replaced in 2006 by the Ministry of Justice. 
77 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s. 26(5). The Commission commenced 
work on 3rd April 2006. 
78 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s. 63(2). 
79 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s. 63(3). 
80 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s. 64(1). 
81 Constitutional Reform Act 2005. The Ombudsman commenced work 3rd 
April 2006. See, also, the first report: Annual Report 2006-2007 (London: 
HMSO, 2007). 
82 Judicial Appointments Commission, Annual Report 2006-07 (London: The 
Stationery Office, 2007). 
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previous system of paper-based “sifts”, and extension of the use 
of role-plays in the selection exercises. 
Data kept on judicial appointments in England and Wales 
now routinely records ethnicity, gender and professional 
background, with reference to those that have applied, been 
interviewed, been appointed, or placed on reserve.  
The introduction of the Judicial Appointments Commission has 
coincided with a significant increase in applications for judicial 




Scotland was the first jurisdiction within the United 
Kingdom to introduce an independent body – the Judicial 
Appointments Board for Scotland – to select and make 
recommendations on judicial appointments following concerns 
about lack of transparency in the old appointments system.83  
The Board is required by virtue of an executive mandate issued in 
2001 by the Scottish Ministers to, inter alia, recommend to the 
First Minister candidates for specified judicial office,84 on the 
basis of merit, but in addition to consider ways of recruiting a 
judiciary which is as representative as possible of the 
communities in which they serve.85 The Board commenced work 
in June 2002. In the absence of statutory functions or further 
executive guidance, the Board has developed, and refined, a range 
of principles, policies and procedures. Initial principles and 
policies required adherence to equal opportunities (later modified 
_____________________________________________________ 
83 Scottish Executive, Judicial Appointments: An Inclusive Approach 
(Edinburgh: Scottish Executive, 2000). 
84 Judge of the Court of Session, sheriff principal, sheriff and part-time sheriff. 
The Board currently has no role over appointments to the post of Lord 
President and Lord Justice Clerk. In 2007, the Board agreed with the Scottish 
Executive to undertake responsibility for appointments to the new lay justices. 
85 The Judicial Appointments Board for Scotland, Annual Report 2002 – 2003, 
p.3. For discussion of the background to, and brief assessment of, the Board, 
see Paterson, “The Scottish Judicial Appointments Board: New Wine in Old 
Bottles?” in Malleson and Russell (eds.), Appointing Judges, p. 13. The 
Scottish Executive has laid draft legislation before parliament – Judiciary and 
Courts (Scotland) Bill (SP Bill 06) – following consultation to, inter alia, put 
the Board on a statutory footing.  
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to “diversity”), avoidance of any conflict of interest, and respect 
for confidentiality.86 The Board currently monitors applications 
with particular reference to age, gender, ethnicity, national origin, 
and disability.87 In 2007, it created a Diversity Working Group to, 
broadly, research applications with reference to diversity in the 
legal profession in Scotland and to suggest measures to increase 
any under-representation in applications to judicial office. For the 
purpose of the Working Group, the Board notes that diversity 
“may” relate to gender, ethnicity, disability, age, religion or 
belief, and/or sexual orientation.88 
The application procedure involves two broad stages. 
First, sift of applications; involving assessment of application 
forms against published criteria and referees’ assessment.  
The Board applies 17 criteria for assessing “merit”. The second 
stage involves interviewing selected candidates, in which each 
candidate makes a presentation and is then questioned by the 
panel. The sift stage was modified in 2007-08 to comprise two 
elements.89 First, members of the Board individually assess all 
the application forms received before a preliminary sift meeting 
against the criteria, and then produce on the basis of initial 
assessments, a “long list” of candidates. Significantly, the lay 
members contribute their views first – thus reducing the 
possibility that they may feel the need to defer to judicial/ legal 
members. Secondly, the Board members individually assess the 
applications and referees reports, and agree a short-list of 
candidates who are invited for interview. The First Minister has 
never rejected a recommendation of the Board. If the First 
Minister were to do so, reasons in writing must be given to the 
Board. 
 
C. Northern Ireland 
 The Judicial Appointments Commission for Northern 
Ireland was established on 15th June 2005 to conduct the 
appointments process and make recommendations to the Lord 
_____________________________________________________ 
86 The Judicial Appointments Board for Scotland, Annual Report 2002 – 2003. 
87 Because of the slightly different process of “long-listing” in Scotland, the 
Board also records data on the long-listing process. 
88 The Judicial Appointments Board for Scotland, Annual Report 2006 – 2007. 
89 The Judicial Appointments Board for Scotland, Annual Report 2006 – 2007. 
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Chancellor regarding all judicial offices up to and including the 
High Court; recommend candidates solely on the basis of merit, 
and engage in a programme of action to secure in so far as it is 
reasonably practicable that appointments are reflective of the 
community in Northern Ireland.90 Prior to commencement of the 
Commission, appointments were administered by the Judicial 
Appointments Unit of the Northern Ireland Court Service on 
behalf of the Lord Chancellor. A Commissioner for Judicial 
Appointments for Northern Ireland was responsible for, primarily, 
auditing appointments and handling complaints in respect of 
appointments to judicial office and silk.91 That office had, in 
recognition of Northern Ireland’s recent troubled political history, 
been recommended in 2001 as an interim measure prior to 
devolution of justice powers to the Northern Ireland Assembly.92  
The audit role of the former Commissioner has now been 
replaced by that of a Judicial Appointments Ombudsman, 
appointed 26th September 2006. 
 The Commissioner’s Audit Report 2003 reported low 
representation in appointments to judicial office and awards of 
silk. The Commissioner recommended that while selection should 
continue to be made on the basis of merit, the selection should be 
based on competencies which were clearly defined, transparent 
and publicly announced. A research report on the representation 
of women in silk and judicial office conducted on behalf of the 
Commissioner found among women respondents significant 
perceived obstacles to attaining judicial office.93 The report made 
a series of recommendations to enhance the process, including 
changes to eligibility criteria, the appointments process, judicial 
working practices, encouragement to women lawyers, and 
improvement in professional complaints procedures.  
_____________________________________________________ 
90 Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2004, and Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 
2002. 
91 From 2001. For background, annual reports etc., see: 
http://cjani.courtsni.gov.uk. 
92 Criminal Justice Review Group, Review of the Criminal Justice System in 
Northern Ireland (Belfast: Criminal Justice Review, 2000). 
93 Feenan, Applications by Women for Silk and Judicial Office in Northern 
Ireland (2005). 
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 Some of the consultation features of the appointments 
process in Northern Ireland are distinctive. Where the eligibility 
criteria require a member of the legal profession, the applicant 
must provide the names of three consultees – all of whom must 
also be members of the legal profession. The Commission states 
that it is desirable but not essential that at least one of these 
should be a holder of a specified judicial office. In addition, for 
appointment to the High Court comments are automatically 
sought from the serving Lord Justices of Appeal and High Court 
Judges in addition to the Chair of the Bar and the President of the 
Law Society. On the 17th October 2007, the Commission 
launched a consultation exercise on the policies and procedures 
for appointment to judicial office – which addresses, amongst 
other matters, whether such consultation procedures should be 
changed. 
 Perhaps of particular interest in relation to judicial 
appointments in Ireland, the Commission established early a 
Diversity Committee whose programme of action includes 
seeking to broaden the pool of potential applicants to ensure that a 
judicial career is open to as wide a range of people as possible.94 
To this end, the Committee agreed a number of key objectives, 
including evaluation of each appointment scheme and 
improvement, where appropriate, to increase the diversity of the 
applicant pool. The Commission has sought to augment existing 
“equity” monitoring data on applicants to judicial office since 
2004 to include former judicial office holders. This data will 
cover age, gender, community background, race, disability, and 
geographical location.  
 
D. Canada 
Within the federation of Canada, judicial appointments are 
made variously for the federal level or the provincial/territorial 
level.95 Appointments to the highest court, the Supreme Court of 
Canada, are made by the Prime Minister. Alleged lack of 
_____________________________________________________ 
94 See its first annual report: Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments 
Commission, Annual Report and Accounts 2005-2006 (London: The Stationery 
Office, 2007). 
95 For further details, consult the website of the Office of the Commissioner for 
Federal Judicial Affairs: http://www.fja.gc.ca. 
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transparency in this process, and concern about the substantially 
increased power of Supreme Court justices following the 
introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, has prompted 
calls for reform.96 Indeed, unprecedented debate in 2004 over 
government influence in an appointment led to the Government 
setting up an ad hoc committee of the House of Commons to 
interview the government’s nominee before confirmation of his 
appointment. Judicial appointments to the superior courts in each 
province or territory are made by the Governor General on the 
recommendation of the federal cabinet. Concern about political 
patronage at the level of provincial courts gave rise to the creation 
of nominating commissions. These conduct the initial 
recruitment, screening, and recommendation to the government.  
Of particular interest is the approach of the Judicial 
Appointments Advisory Committee in the province of Ontario. 
The Committee encourages applications by under-represented 
groups, through, for example, advertisements that state: “[i]n 
order to improve the representation of traditionally under-
represented groups in the judiciary, applications are particularly 
encouraged from aboriginal peoples, francophones, person with 
disabilities, racial minorities and women”.97 The Committee 
recommends to the Attorney General candidates to the Ontario 
Court of Justice Bench. There are 13 members of the Committee: 
three representing the judiciary, three representing the legal 
profession, and seven lay members appointed by the Attorney 
General. The Committee is legislatively required to conduct the 
assessment of candidates in “recognition of the desirability of 
reflecting the diversity of Ontario society in judicial 
appointments”.98 This is operationalised in the criteria used in 
assessment of candidates, as follows: “[t]he Judiciary … should 
be reasonably representative of the population it serves. This 
_____________________________________________________ 
96 Morton, “Judicial Appointments in Post-Charter Canada: A System in 
Transition” in Malleson and Russell (eds.), Appointing Judges, p. 56; Ziegel, 
“A New Era in the Selection of Supreme Court Judges?” (2006) 44 Osgoode 
Hall Law Journal 547. 
97 Quoted in Omatsu, “The Fiction of Judicial Impartiality” in MacDonald, 
Osborne and Smith (eds.), Feminism, Law, Inclusion: Intersectionality in 
Action (Toronto: Sumach Press, 2005), p. 70, 70. 
98 The Courts of Justice Statute Law Amendment Act, 1994, s. 43(9)(3). 
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requires overcoming the under-representation in the judicial 
complement of women, visible, cultural, and racial minorities and 
persons with a disability”.99 This approach may be contrasted 
with the approach in the United Kingdom, where the need to 
reflect diversity is not a component of the overall criterion of 
merit. The reform of the approach to “merit” in Ontario reflected 
a recognition that the traditional understanding of “merit” might 
serve to replicate homogeneity, and inhibit diversity – which is, 
of course, not antithetical to securing the best judge.  One other 
aspect of the approach of the Committee to consultation is 
noteworthy when contrasted with that of the new judicial 
appointments bodies in the United Kingdom. The Committee not 
only carries out named-reference checks, but also makes 
confidential inquiries of the judiciary, court officials, lawyers, law 
associations, community and social service organizations.100 
 
E. South Africa 
The transformation of South Africa in the 1990s from an 
apartheid state introduced radical reform of judicial selection.101 
The judiciary under apartheid was widely seen as part of the 
problem with that system.102 The method of selecting judges was 
described as “informal, secret and unaccountable” and 
“susceptible to abuse and political pressure”.103 In April 1994, 
there were 165 judges, of whom three were black males, and two 
white females. The rest were white. There were no black females. 
The constitutional changes later that year changed the law, 
process and political context of appointments. Section 174(1) of 
the Constitution provides that “the need for the judiciary to reflect 
broadly the racial and gender composition of South Africa must 
be considered when judicial officers are appointed”. Within ten 
years of the introduction of the Constitution, there was an 
_____________________________________________________ 
99 Judicial Appointments Advisory Committee, Policies and Process, (Toronto: 
Judicial Appointments Advisory Committee, 2005), p. 10. 
100 Judicial Appointments Advisory Committee, Policies and Process, p. 15. 
101 Du Bois, “Judicial Selection in Post-Apartheid South Africa” in Malleson 
and Russell (eds.), Appointing Judges, 280. 
102 Corder, “Judicial Authority in a Changing South Africa” (2004) 24 Legal 
Studies 253. 
103 Corder, “The Appointment of Judges: Some Comparative Ideas” (1992) 3 
Stellenbosch Law Review 207, 226. 
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increase in the proportion of black judges from under 2% to 
approximately 34%,104 though the rate of increase for women 
since 1994 has been much slower.105  
Section 178 of the Constitution created a Judicial Service 
Commission to ensure transparency, independence and 
accountability in the appointment of judges to the higher courts. 
The Commission’s role in respect of High Court and other 
specified posts is determinative in that the President “must 
appoint … on the advice of” the Commission.106 In respect of 
appointment to the Constitutional Court – where issues of law and 
policy may be particularly potent – the Commission must provide 
the President with “a list of nominees with three names more than 
the number” of vacancies which exist. If the President finds the 
nominees “unacceptable”107 he must advise the Commission of 
the reasons for this view. The Commission must then supplement 
the list with further nominees and the President must make the 
remaining appointments from the supplemented list.  
While the Commission’s powers and functions are set out 
in the Constitution, it may determine its own procedure.  
The Commission takes into account the requirement that 
candidates who are appointed “be committed to the values of the 
Constitution”.108 The Commission also takes into account the 
“symbolism” of a particular appointment, by considering: “[w]hat 
message is projected to the community at large”109 by such 
appointment. 
The Commission comprises 23 permanent members, 
including members of the judiciary and legal profession. 
_____________________________________________________ 
104 Moerane, “The Meaning of Transformation of the Judiciary in the New 
South African Context” (2003) 120 South African Law Journal 708. 
105 Cowan, “Women’s Representation on the Courts in the Republic of South 
Africa” (2006) 6 University of Maryland Law Journal Race Religion Gender & 
Class 291. 
106 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s. 174(6). 
107 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s. 174(4)(b). 
108 Judicial Service Commission, Annual Report 2004 (Bloemfontein: Judicial 
Service, 2004). 
109 Judicial Service Commission, Report on the Activities of the Judicial 
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Significantly, there is a role for members of the executive: six 
persons, at least three of whom must be members of opposition 
parties represented in the National Assembly. Significantly, the 
Commission has also permitted interviews of candidates to be 
held in public, though not televised or tape-recorded. 
The operation of the Commission has generally been seen 
as having gained widespread confidence,110 notwithstanding 
concerns about delays in appointments, and some inappropriate 
questions in the interview process.111 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article has identified a number of problematic aspects 
in the system of judicial appointments in Ireland, and provided 
illustrations from a small number of jurisdictions which may 
provide lessons for reform. Chief among the problems are the 
ongoing influence, or risk of influence, of Government patronage 
in the process, and the lack of diversity in the judiciary.  
The creation of the Judicial Appointments Advisory Board does 
not adequately address these problems. There remains a 
perception, even among the judges, that political patronage still 
plays a part in appointments. The general view of superior judges 
of the Judicial Appointments Advisory Board is that “it was a 
good idea in theory, but in practice, it had made very little 
difference to the political patronage system of judicial 
appointments.”112 Indeed, one judge is quoted as saying that 
“very often the government pick their own supporters. So the idea 
that people are appointed purely on merit is not necessarily 
true”.
population, comprising an increasing number of migrants, will 
_____________________________________________________ 
113 
It is likely that the momentum for reform of judicial 
selection will increase in Ireland – as it has elsewhere – with the 
Irish Government’s position on judicial appointments appearing 
increasingly untenable. The changing demography of Ireland’s 
110 Malleson, “Assessing the Performance of the Judicial Service Commission” 
(1999) 16 South African Law Journal 36. 
111 Andrews, “The South African Judicial Appointments Process” (2006) 44 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 565. 
112 Carroll, “You be the Judge: Part II” (above), at 186. 
113 Carroll, “You be the Judge: Part II”, at 186. 
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likely increase pressure for a judiciary that is representative of the 
diversity of the population.  
Where judges reach decisions on matters of public interest, 
it seems appropriate in a democracy that there be some role for 
elected representatives in the appointment, and, indeed, removal 
of judges. This is not incompatible with international principles, 
such as the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary.  
If reform of judicial appointments is to be pursued in 
Ireland it appears that the most appropriate model would be one 
that necessarily combines the constitutional requirement for 
government advice to the President; with a reformed process 
which draws out the legitimate role for elected representatives in 
selection, and which is based on fairness, transparency, 
accountability, and a commitment to representativeness and 
diversity. In this way, Isaac Butt’s exhortation in another place 
132 years ago may remain a statement from the past rather than a 
haunting echo in times present.  
